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Abstract—Multi-recipient cryptographic schemes provide se-
cure communication, between one sender and multiple recipients,
in a multi-party group. Providing secure multi-party commu-
nication is very challenging, especially in dynamic networks.
Existing multi-recipient cryptographic schemes pose a variety of
limitations. These include high computational overhead for both
encryption and decryption, additional communication overhead
and high setup cost due to change in membership, and collusion
among recipients. In order to overcome these limitations, this
paper introduces a novel asymmetric multi-recipient crypto-
graphic scheme, AMOUN. In the proposed scheme, to better
utilize network resources, the sender transmits a ciphertext
containing different messages to multiple recipients, where each
recipient only allowed to retrieve its own designated message.
Security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme is indis-
tinguishable under adaptive chosen plaintext attack. Quantitative
analysis reveals that lightweight AMOUN shows lower average
computational cost than both RSA and Multi-RSA, for both
encryption and decryption, even when the key sizes are four times
larger. For a given prime size, in case of encryption, AMOUN
shows 98% and 99% lower average computational cost than RSA
and Multi-RSA, respectively. For decryption, AMOUN shows a
performance improvement of 99% compared to RSA and Multi-
RSA.
Index Terms—Multi-recipient encryption, asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, indistinguishability, chinese remainder theorem, chosen
plaintext attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, multi-party communication is experiencing a sig-
nificant surge in research interest due to the massive growth of
its applications [1], [2], [3]. In the presence of adversaries and
the possibility of illicit cooperation between two or more group
members, also known as collusion, and in the absence of pre-
established trust for group keys in highly dynamic networks,
securing multi-party communication becomes very challeng-
ing. In multi-party communication, multi-party group, also
known as a receiving group, consists of nodes/users having
the same demands at a specific time and location [4]. The
membership of group may continuously vary which is caused
by the change in group members’ preferences, characteristics
of wireless media, and nodes’ mobility [4], [5]. Multi-party
secure communication (MSC), also known as secure one-to-
many group communication, is used by an individual sender
to share information with a group of recipients. In MSC, the
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single encrypted sent message could have the same or different
contents for a set of recipients.
Multi-recipient cryptography, a key enabler for MSC, is
required to set up secure channels for the data exchange
in different types of end-user applications [1], [2], [3]. It
is also needed for securing key management including key
establishment and key exchange between sender and receiving
group in a highly dynamic networks, such as vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) and wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
[6], [7]. Since standard encryption schemes do not allow to
exploit batching for MSC, as each recipient receives a separate
encrypted message; therefore, it results in a degradation in
performance and inefficient use of bandwidth. Thus, there is a
need to have multi-recipient cryptographic schemes, where all
recipients in a group either require same or different contents
from an individual sender in a single message [5], [8]. Existing
multi-recipient cryptographic schemes mainly focused on se-
curing one-to-many communications without considering the
computational and bandwidth constraints, which makes such
schemes less practical for dynamic networks [8], [9].
There has not been much research carried out on schemes
aiming to share different contents within a single ciphertext,
by a sender to multiple recipients. However, many applications
can be benefited from such schemes. For example, in VANETs,
Road Side Unit (RSU) can share multiple secret keys to
member of multiple sub-groups in single ciphertext using
multi-recipient cryptography. To accomplish this, RSU sends
the ciphertext to cluster heads, and then each cluster head
multicasts the secret key among its group members [10], [11].
Similarly, on-the-fly firmware can be updated to receiving
nodes, in dynamic networks such as VANETs or WSNs [12],
[13]. In multicast publish/subscribe-based applications, the
sending or receiving nodes could be a member of multiple
groups/sub-groups [4], [14], [15]. For such applications, the
sender can send the information to different groups/sub-groups
in a single ciphertext, and each recipient can retrieve its
corresponding group message by decrypting the ciphertext.
Other futuristic applications include scenarios where multi-
modal data of specific entity needs to be sent remotely to
multiple entities located in same physical premises, and every
receiving entity has different access control rights to get a
portion of the multi-modal data. To fulfill the requirements of
such applications, this paper proposes an efficient asymmet-
ric multi-recipient cryptographic scheme, AMOUN, which is
provably indistinguishable under adaptive chosen plaintext at-
tack (IND−CPA). AMOUN enables a sender to send different
information to multiple recipients in a single attempt to save
computational and bandwidth resources. This research focuses
on the confidentiality of transmitted data between the sender
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2and receiving group; therefore, we assume that there exists
already a reliable authentication protocol [12], [13], [16].
Existing multi-recipient cryptographic solutions introduce,
a) the computational and communication overhead due to
change in group membership, b) the ciphertexts concatenation
constraints, c) the need for key distribution, d) possibility of
compromising group privacy, e) the need for group key, f)
collusion among recipients, and g) the limitation of send-
ing the same message for all recipients. To overcome the
above-mentioned challenges, AMOUN effectively leverages
the mathematical formulations of Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) [17], prime factorization [18], discrete logarithm [19],
and the use of noise parameter [20], [21]. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme avoids the requirement of additional compu-
tational and communication overhead when group membership
of receiving group changes. It only requires receiving members
to keep their private keys safe and share their public keys.
Moreover, it neither requires a group key nor a sender to know
the private keys of recipients to generate the public key. Also,
similar to RSA, AMOUN requires minimal collusion between
the sender and receiving group and allows for plausible
deniability [9], [22]. Additionally, AMOUN does not suffer
from the key distribution problem due to its fully asymmetric
nature. Therefore, AMOUN is more practical because there is
no need to either concatenate ciphertexts or to share secrets
between members of receiving group. On top of that, there
is a significant decrease in terms of computational overhead
compared to other existing asymmetric schemes.
In [5], we introduced the basic idea of AMOUN for MSC.
This paper extends the basic idea to a complete multi-recipient
asymmetric cryptographic scheme. The major contributions
of this paper are as follows: First, it presents AMOUN’s
algorithms along with formal security proof to verify that the
proposed scheme is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen
plaintext attack (IND−CPA). Second, to prove AMOUN’s
applicability, it presents a validation analysis by giving a
mathematical proof. Third, it presents a detailed empirical
analysis to prove AMOUN’s effectiveness in terms of its low
computational and communication overhead.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
reviews the related work and their shortcomings. Section III
presents the mathematical notation and definitions. Section
IV discusses AMOUN’s algorithms. Section V explains the
validation analysis of proposed scheme. Section VI illustrates
the security analysis of our solution and possible attacks. Sec-
tion VII provides the time complexity analysis. Section VIII
shows the evaluation of proposed scheme. Section IX discusses
the comparative and quantitative analysis of AMOUN with
other asymmetric cryptographic schemes. Lastly, section X
concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews the recent state of the art one-to-
many cryptographic schemes and provides a brief overview of
their shortcomings. The related works of one-to-many cryp-
tography can be divided into two main categories: symmetric
cryptographic and asymmetric cryptographic schemes. Table
I presents comparison of AMOUN with existing one-to-many
cryptographic schemes considering following factors: concate-
nation of ciphertexts, need for key distribution, communication
and computational overhead between sender and recipients
for change in group membership, computational overhead for
encryption and decryption, additional recipient setup costs,
collusion among recipients, need for group key, and threat
of group privacy.
A. Symmetric Cryptographic Schemes
Symmetric cryptographic schemes for one-to-many systems
suffer from many disadvantages. In [27], Micciancio et al. pro-
vide a competitive analysis of different types of one-to-many
cryptographic schemes and group key distribution schemes.
They explain that such algorithms encounter the group privacy
problem, where a subset of users needs to collude with
each other to combine their secret information to decrypt the
transmission of the sender. This study shows that all of the
studied one-to-many cryptographic protocols require group
key distribution. Unlike these symmetric schemes, AMOUN
doesn’t have any such requirement, as parties only need to
publish their public keys to a common source for the sender
to access them. Another effort using a symmetric scheme can
be found in [23]. The authors discussed minimal storage and
minimal communication based cryptographic scheme. In the
minimal storage method, every recipient carries private and
group keys that they use when a change in the recipients’
group takes place. On the other hand, their minimal commu-
nication method uses a tree structure with the sender at the
root and recipients at leaf nodes. Every recipient knows the
keys of all nodes between the root and themselves. A change
in the receiving group trickles down to all the nodes on the
path between the root and the modified node. Engaging other
parties in this communication setup and teardown eventually
creates privacy concerns about the shared information between
the nodes on the same path in the tree. In contrast to [23],
AMOUN does not require additional communication and com-
putational costs at recipients side when a change in receiving
group occurs. Moreover, our scheme is a native asymmetric
implementation where all recipients are independent with their
public and private key pair, and no centralized key distribution
is needed.
Ambiguous Multi-Symmetric Cryptography (AMSC) is an-
other one-to-many symmetric cryptographic system based on
CRT [22]. It narrates that the knowledge of all moduli in CRT
is fundamental to get all messages from the ciphertext. While
AMSC has been proven to be faster than many other sym-
metric cryptographic schemes, it requires collusion between
sender and recipients for exchanging keys [22], [28]. Also, it
faces the key distribution problems, one of the fundamental
challenges with symmetric cryptography [18]. These can be
solved using asymmetric key distribution protocols. Manag-
ing symmetric algorithms requires resources not needed in
an asymmetric implementation. Considering a system with
limited resources, key distribution can become impossible or
extremely difficult as the number of participants increases.
In addition, such an expansion leads to an exponential in-
crease in memory requirements for key storage, which is
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impossible in edge-connected devices. Due to its asymmetric
nature, AMOUN does not require an additional layer of key
distribution prior to the secure communication.
Few schemes were proposed that integrate authentica-
tion and confidentiality using symmetric one-to-many cryp-
tographic techniques [29], [30]. For example, a well-known
approach in this regard[24] proposes one-way hash chains and
loosely synchronization protocols. However, this scheme has
many limitations. First, computational costs and communica-
tion delays are introduced by the time needed to authenticate
the messages. This impact is further magnified due to the
need for a periodic key regeneration, which is an additional
overhead, particularly in the resource-constrained networks.
Also, this scheme is not scalable and suffers from key distri-
bution issues when it assumes that one-way hash chains are
initially sent via a secure channel. These drawbacks are solved
in our schemes, where there is no need for the periodic key
regeneration. In addition, if there is a change in the receiving
group, AMOUN requires no communication overhead. This
makes AMOUN ideal for systems, such as VANETs, where
there exists little or no trust among individual recipients.
Lastly, as AMOUN solely relies on the key generation by
the system’s users, it involves reduced setup cost compared
to existing symmetric one-to-many cryptographic solutions.
B. Asymmetric Cryptographic Schemes
To solve the above-mentioned challenges of symmetric one-
to-many cryptographic schemes, Dodis et al. [25], adopted the
minimal communication based cryptographic scheme defined
in [23] using asymmetric cryptographic. However, this solution
introduces a huge communication overhead for revoking or
adding recipients. In AMOUN, the sender simply changes
receiving group members without ever having to notify other
receiving group members. Additionally, with AMOUN, there
is much less setup cost, since we do not have to construct
whole tree structure and generate keys ahead of time, which
adds an extra computational overhead as it uses asymmetric
cryptographic.
On the other hand, RSA is a standard cryptographic scheme
used today, created by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman [18]. RSA and AMOUN have a similar mathematical
base as they both heavily rely on properties of modulus
[17] and prime factorization problem [18]. Security of RSA
depends on the difficulty of factoring two large prime numbers
and the property of two modular inverses in a Euler’s phi space
of a number. These two characteristics make the RSA scheme
extremely hard to break, for large enough key size, without
knowing the private key [18]. In normal asymmetric crypto-
graphic systems, including RSA, a one-to-many cryptographic
system could be implemented by concatenating ciphertexts
together and sending the resultant message. These systems
face several challenges. First, both the sender and recipient
have to agree on a ciphertext offset in the concatenation.
To accomplish this, the sender and recipient will need to
collude before the start of the multi-party communication.
This violates the principles of asymmetric cryptography that
abandon the need for the parties to communicate prior for
4sending the information. Also, manipulating the offsets for
every message introduces the overhead of an extra communica-
tion per message, while a constant offset requires padding, for
example addition of zeros, to account for empty spaces leading
to an inefficient larger ciphertext size. Another limitation is
that ciphertexts are only concatenated but not mixed. This
enables attackers to target specific ciphertext or listen to only
parts of the entire concatenation to find specific messages. In
addition, if the attacker knows the size of ciphertexts, he can
determine the number of messages exchanged. Hence, we can
conclude that such concatenation compromises the security of
a message exchange [9].
Since the creation of RSA, many researchers have proposed
new derivative cryptographic schemes using it as a base. One
of the most known modifications is CRT-RSA [31]. This
scheme uses CRT to split up the decryption key into two
pieces to make the exponentiation faster. Although, CRT-
RSA uses CRT, however, it is not designed for secure group
communication [31]. Shared RSA, another extension of RSA,
can be used for secure communication from one-to-many, or
many-to-many [26]. The major problem with Shared RSA
is that it requires collusion among recipients in order to
work successfully. This means that each recipient must be
individually trusted. More importantly, in this scheme, all
recipients need to share a common secret among themselves.
This not only adds additional recipient initial setup cost, but
also introduces system communication overhead in case of
any change in membership of receiving group. This overhead
further increases, as the number of the recipients increases. In
our scheme, we solved this issue by only using the public keys
without the need for membership re-configuration process,
which introduces huge computational and communication
overhead.
In [9], authors proposed a one-to-many asymmetric cryp-
tographic scheme, Multi-RSA, which is based on RSA and
CRT to address the limitations of existing solutions for one-
to-many asymmetric RSA schemes. In this paper, we com-
pare our scheme with Multi-RSA since, like RSA, it relies
on properties of modulus and prime factorization problem
[17], [18]. Although, Multi-RSA has the same communication
overhead as AMOUN; however, it suffers heavily from using
RSA cryptographic scheme as a base, since RSA scheme is
known to have high computational cost for both encryption
and decryption, which makes it hard to implement Multi-
RSA in dynamic mobile network environments and makes
this scheme less scalable. AMOUN achieves all of the benefits
of Multi-RSA with significant improvement in terms of time
required for both encryption and decryption by introducing a
lightweight one-to-many asymmetric cryptographic scheme.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the notation used by AMOUN’s
algorithms and provides formal definitions of the proposed
scheme.
A. Mathematical Notation
Let N = {1,2,3, . . . ,} be the set of of natural numbers
and Z = {. . . ,−3,−2,−1,0,1,2,3, . . .} be the set of integer
numbers. We write a≡ b (mod n) if a and b are two integers
that have the same remainder when divided by n∈N. For each
n ∈ N, Zn = {0,1,2, . . . ,n−1} is the ring of integers modulo
n. Elements of Zn are called classes of the set of integers
modulo n, and each class contains all integers that have the
same residue modulo n. For instance, a≡ b (mod n), if and
only if a and b appear in the same class of integers modulo
n, e.g. 0¯ = {0,n,2 ·n, . . . ,k ·n, . . .}. The length of a string Y is
denoted by |Y |, whereas the set of binary strings of finite length
is denoted by {0,1}∗. Also, 1α refers to the string
α︷ ︸︸ ︷
11 . . .1. For
future reference in the section, we denote F1
$←− F if F1 is a set
taken uniformly at random from F . In the case when there are
several sets F1,F2, . . . ,Fv obtained uniformly at random from
the set F , we will use the abbreviation F1,F2, . . . ,Fv
$←− F .
For every v ∈ N we also use F $←− A(F1,F2, . . . ,Fv) to mean
that F is the output of the randomized algorithm A on inputs
F1,F2, . . . ,Fv. Notation X
$←− Y is used for the operation of
assigning the value Y to X .
B. Definitions and Theorems
Below, we give some definitions and theorems for the
AMOUN cryptosystem.
Lemma 1. Let a,b∈Z and n∈N. We say that a≡ b (mod n)
(a is congruent to b modulo n) if and only if n|(a−b) [32].
Theorem 1. For every a,b,c,d ∈ Z and every n ∈ N the
following statements hold true:
• a≡ a (mod n),
• a≡ b (mod n) implies b≡ a (mod n),
• a≡ b (mod n) and b≡ c (mod n) implies a≡ c (mod
n),
• a ≡ b (mod n) and c ≡ d (mod n) implies (a± c) ≡
(b±d) (mod n),
• a ≡ b (mod n) and c ≡ d (mod n) implies a · c ≡ b ·
d (mod n),
• a≡ b (mod n) implies ai ≡ bi (mod n), for every i ∈N.
Definition 1. Let a,b ∈ Z be two integers. An integer d is the
greatest common divisor of a, b if it is a multiple of every
common divisor of a and b i.e., if d1|a,d1|b, then d1|d.
Theorem 2. Let n1,n2, . . . ,nz be z pairwise relatively prime
numbers and a1,a2, . . . ,az ∈ Z. Then, the system of equations
x≡ a1 (mod n1)
x≡ a2 (mod n2)
...
x≡ ai (mod ni)
...
x≡ az (mod nz)
has a unique solution modulo n = n1 ·n2 · . . . ·nz [17].
5Definition 2. A function f : N −→ [0,1] is called negligible if
lim
n→∞ f (n) = 0
and
lim
n→∞
f (n)
1
p(n)
= 0
for every polynomial p : N −→ N and all n≥ np, where np is
some natural number.
We now continue by describing the syntax of an encryption
scheme. In this research, we define our multi-recipient
asymmetric cryptographic scheme, AMOUN, by following
the standard definitions of asymmetric cryptographic schemes
from [8], [33], [34], [35]. Moreover, we are extending the
standard definitions in order to add an initialization algorithm.
Therefore, our multi-recipient asymmetric cryptographic
scheme AMOUN = (KG, I,E,D) consists of four algorithms:
• The key generation algorithm, KG, is a probabilistic
algorithm that takes in 1α as an input, where α ∈ N is a
security parameter, and returns public and private keys,
K+i and K
−
i , respectively.
• The initialization algorithm, I, is a probabilistic
algorithm that takes in a list of public keys
K+1 , ...,K
+
n to produce a list of initialization parameters
L = {{N′1,AX1}}, . . . ,{N′n,AXn}}, which is needed for
encryption.
• The encryption algorithm, E, is a probabilistic algorithm
that takes in the list of parameters L, a list of public
key elements e1, ...,en, a list of coins r = {r1, ...,rn},
and a message vector M = {m1, . . . ,mn}, to produce the
ciphertext C, where r is provided from the sender to
randomize the ciphertext C.
• The decryption algorithm, D, is a deterministic algorithm
that takes in the private key K−i and the ciphertext C
to produce either the message mi ∈ {0,1}∗ or a special
symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext C was invalid.
Each message mi in the vector M has been created from
a message space MsgSp(v), where 1 < v < 1α . Moreover,
it is important to clarify that the notation C $←− EL(M) is
the shorthand for r $←− CoinE(1α); C $←− EL(M,r), where
CoinE(1α) generates the random coins list r for the encryption
algorithm E. Based on the above mentioned discussion, the
following experiment is required to return 1 with probability
1:
For i = 1, ...,n do (K+i ,K
−
i )
$←− KG(1α ) EndFor;
For i = 1, ...,n do Li
$←− I(K+i ) EndFor;
M $←− MsgSp(v); C $←− EL(M);
j $←− {1, ...,n}; If DK−j (C) = mi then return 1 else return 0;
In this research, we will prove that the proposed multi-
recipient asymmetric cryptographic scheme, AMOUN, is se-
cure against adaptive chosen plaintext attack. We identify a
concrete-security version of the standard notion of security of
multi-recipient asymmetric cryptographic schemes in the sense
of indistinguishability as in [8], [33].
Definition 3. [IND-CPA] Let AMOUN = (KG, I,E,D) be a
multi-recipient asymmetric cryptographic scheme. Let Acpa be
an adversary which runs in two stages, f ind and guess, and
has access to an encryption oracle. For b ∈ {0,1}, lets define
the following experiment:
Experiment Expcpa−bAMOUN, Acpa (α)
For i = 1, ...,n do (K+i ,K
−
i )
$←− KG(1α ) EndFor;
(M0,M1,st)
$←− Acpa( f ind,K+1 , ...,K+n );
For i = 1, ...,n do Li
$←− I(K+i ) EndFor;
C $←− EL(Mb);
d $←− Acpa(guess,C,st);
Return d;
In the experiment above, the adversary A performs two
stages. In the first stage, f ind, the adversary A takes in
K+1 , ...,K
+
n and returns two message vectors M0 and M1 of size
n, where |M0|= |M1|, which means that the messages in both
message vectors have the same size, and M0,M1 ∈MsgSp(v).
In addition to that, the first stage returns the parameter st,
which indicates the state information that the adversary wants
to maintain. In the second stage, guess, the encryption oracle
provides the adversary A a challenge ciphertext C which is the
encryption of a randomly selected message vector Mb, where
b ∈ {0,1}. Then, A should guess which message vector was
chosen to get C. Therefore, for IND−CPA attack, we define
the advantage of the adversary, also known as ε , as follows:
AdvcpaAMOUN, Acpa (α) = Pr[Exp
cpa−0
AMOUN, Acpa
(α) = 0] –
Pr[Expcpa−1AMOUN, Acpa (α) = 0].
The proposed cryptographic scheme AMOUN is said to
be IND−CPA secure if the function AdvcpaAMOUN, Acpa(.) is
negligible. In other words, ε should be negligible for any
random polynomial-time adversary A . In this research, we
define the advantage function, ε , of the proposed scheme
for indistinguishability under adaptive chosen plaintext at-
tack with respect to the time− complexity metric, where the
time− complexity is defined as the execution time in the
worst-case scenario that the adversary A requires to perform
the above-mentioned experiment, on a specific fixed hardware
platform.
IV. ALGORITHMS
This section discusses AMOUN’s algorithms: key genera-
tion, initialization, encryption, and decryption. Both key gen-
eration and decryption are performed by the recipients, while
initialization and encryption are done by the sender. The main
novelty of AMOUN is the ability to effectively integrates the
mathematical formulations of CRT [17], prime factorization
6problem [18], discrete logarithm problem [19], and the use
of the noise parameter [20], [21], in order to generate a
lightweight multi-recipient asymmetric cryptographic scheme.
In order for AMOUN to take advantage of CRT, all Nis
must be pairwise relatively prime. In this research, as the size
of prime numbers that are used is 1024− bits or larger, we
assume that there is little to no chance of prime collision,
where the probability that two recipients pick the same prime
is extremely low [5], [32], [36]. Table II shows the glossary
of symbols used by AMOUN.
A. Key Generation (KG)
This algorithm generates four distinct random prime num-
bers ki, pi, qi, and vi. These primes are generated by satisfying
the following chain of inequalities:
1α > ki ∼= pi ∼= qi > vi. (1)
Next, the recipient generates a positive natural random
number, yi, with size less than the size of the prime vi, as
shown in equation (2).
yi = Random(1,vi). (2)
Since vi is a prime number and yi is strictly less than vi,
which implies that gcd(vi,yi) = 1. Therefore, by the extended
Euclidean algorithm [32], [37], the recipient is able to obtain
the inverse of yi modulo vi, y−1i . Thus, ∃y−1i (mod vi) such
that:
y−1i · yi ≡ yi · y−1i ≡ 1 (mod vi). (3)
So far, the recipient has obtained 6 integer numbers, from
which ki, vi, and yi make the private key, K−i < ki,vi,yi >,
needed to decrypt the message. The other three, pi,qi, and
y−1i , are used to generate the elements of the public key
K+i < Ni,ei,di >, satisfying gcd(Ni,ei) = 1, gcd(Ni,di) = 1,
and gcd(ei,di) = 1, as follows:
Ni = ki · pi, (4)
ei = ki ·qi+ y−1i , (5)
di = v
ki
i (mod Ni). (6)
Algorithm 1 presents the steps for Key Generation algo-
rithm.
B. Initialization (I)
In this algorithm, we describe the setup that the sender
needs before encrypting the messages. The sender picks a
group of n > 1 recipients and gets their respective public keys
K+1 , ...,K
+
n . Then, the sender computes N
′
i for every recipient
i, where fi and ti are random integers less than 1α , as shown
in equation (7).
N′i = Ni · fi+di · ti, (7)
TABLE II
GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS
Symbol Description
m Plaintext (Message)
C Ciphertext
K+i Public key for recipient i
K−i Private key for recipient i
Ni,ei,di Parameters from public key
N′i ,AXi Parameters computed in Initialization
X Product of all Nis
ki, pi,qi,vi Primes used in Key Generation
yi Integer number used in Key Generation
y−1i Modular inverse of yi
ti, fi Integer numbers used in Initialization
Ai Modular inverse calculated in Initialization
e′i,Si Parameters calculated in Encryption
n Number of recipients
α Size of keys in bits
gcd Greatest Common Divisor
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code of Key Generation (KG)
input : Size of keys in bits, α , size of array Keys, w.
output: Array Keys which contains both K+i and K
−
i , in
addition to elements needed to generate them.
1 Initialize Keys to an array of size w;
2 for i← 0 to 3 do
3 Keys[i] = GenerateRandomPrime(α);
4 end
5 Keys[4] = GenerateRandom(α);
6 Keys[5] = ModularInverse(Keys[4]);
7 Keys[6] = Keys[0] ·Keys[1];
8 Keys[7] = (Keys[0] ·Keys[2]+Keys[5])modKeys[6];
9 Keys[8] = POW (Keys[3],Keys[0]) mod Keys[6];
10 return Keys;
Afterwards, the sender computes the product of all Nis,
denoted as X , as shown in equation (8). Since Nis are pairwise
relatively prime, then by the extended Euclidean algorithm
[32], [37], we have that gcd(Ni, XNi ) = 1, ∀i, which implies that
there exists a modular inverse Ai, as shown in equation (9).
Using Ai and XNi , the sender computes AXi for each recipient
i, as shown in equation (10). Next, the sender produces a list
of initialization parameters L = {{N′1,AX1}}, . . . ,{N′n,AXn}},
which is needed for encryption phase.
X =
n
∏
i=1
Ni, (8)
Ai · XNi ≡ 1 (mod Ni), (9)
AXi = Ai · XNi . (10)
Moreover, the sender computes the initialization parameters
list L only once for a specific receiving group. If any change
in membership, due to the addition or removal of members,
occurs in the receiving group, the sender applies the following
modifications with minimum overhead to the list of recipients:
7a) adding Li to the list when new recipient i is added to
the receiving group, or b) removing Li from the existing list
when the corresponding ith recipient leaves the group. In
addition to that, there is no need for communication between
the sender and recipients when any change happens to the
receiving group. Therefore, the challenges due to change in
the membership are effectively resolved by AMOUN.
Algorithm 2 presents the steps for Initialization algorithm.
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code of Initialization (I)
input : K+1 < N1,e1,d1 >,...,K
+
n < Nn,en,dn > public
keys of recipients.
output: Array Init_L where Li is calculated for every
recipient i and X is the last element in the array.
1 Initialize Init_L to an array of size n+1;
2 Init_L[n+1] = 1;
3 Initialize Init_N to an array of size n;
4 Initialize Init_A to an array of size n;
5 Initialize Init_AX to an array of size n;
6 Initialize f to an array of size n;
7 Initialize t to an array of size n;
8 for i← 1 to n do
9 f [i] = GenerateRandom(α);
10 t[i] = GenerateRandom(α);
11 Init_N[i] = N[i] · f [i]+d[i] · t[i];
12 Init_L[n+1]·= N[i];
/* Init_L[n+1] contains X */
13 end
14 for i← 1 to n do
/* Finding Ai, using the extended
Euclidean algorithm, as a modular
inverse of XNi */
15 Init_A[i] = exEucl((Init_L[n+1]/N[i]),N[i]);
16 Init_AX [i] = Init_A[i] · Init_L[n+1]/N[i];
17 Init_L[i] = {Init_N[i], Init_AX [i]};
18 end
19 return Init_L;
C. Encryption (E)
In this algorithm, the sender takes in a message vector M of
size n in addition to L, where n > 1. The only constraint for
the size of message mi is that it must be less than vi. Moreover,
the sender computes e′i, ∀i, using ei,N′i , and ri, as shown in
equation (11).
e′i = ei+N
′
i · ri. (11)
The parameter ri is a different randomly generated coin
that is produced using a truly random number generator less
than 1α . The reason for adding this coin ri is to randomize
the resultant ciphertext in order to avoid IND-CPA attack, as
discussed in section VI. Using the parameters e′i and AXi, the
sender computes the encryption parameter Si for each recipient
i, as shown in equation (12).
Si = e′i ·AXi. (12)
After that, using M and S, the sender generates the com-
mon ciphertext C for all recipients using equation (13). This
ciphertext is then sent to the receiving group. Alternatively,
messages of multiple recipients can be encrypted in parallel
first, and then all resultant sub-ciphertexts, c1, · · · ,cn, could
be added. Also, if memory is a concern for the encryption,
mod X can be done on each term individually. So, additions
can be split up with modulus running in-between to minimize
memory utilization.
C =
( n
∑
i=1
mi ·Si
)
(mod X). (13)
Algorithm 3 presents the steps for Encryption algorithm.
Algorithm 3: Pseudo code of Encryption (E)
input : Message vector M, list of parameters L, and
parameter X .
output: Ciphertext C.
1 Initialize Enc_S to an array of size n;
2 Initialize Enc_e to an array of size n;
3 Initialize r to an array of size n;
4 C = 0;
5 for i← 1 to n do
6 r[i] = GenerateRandom(α);
7 Enc_e[i] = e[i]+ Init_N[i] · r[i];
8 Enc_S[i] = Enc_e[i] · Init_AX [i];
9 C += m[i] ·Enc_S[i];
10 end
11 C =C mod X ;
12 return C;
D. Decryption (D)
In this algorithm, each recipient decrypts the ciphertext C
using its own private key, K−i < ki,vi,yi >, in order to retrieve
mi, using equation (14).
mi = (C (mod ki) · yi) (mod vi). (14)
Algorithm 4 presents the steps for Decryption algorithm.
Algorithm 4: Pseudo code of Decryption (D)
input : Ciphertext C, private key K−i < ki,vi,yi >.
output: Message mi.
1 mi = ((C mod ki) · yi) mod vi;
2 return mi;
8V. VALIDATION ANALYSIS
In this section, we validate our proposed cryptographic
scheme mathematically by giving an algebraic proof of equa-
tion (14). Furthermore, we prove that each recipient i can
obtain the message mi sent to him by applying the private key
elements, ki,vi and yi to the ciphertext C, as shown in (14). We
do so by considering the right hand-side of the equation (14),
and through some operations based on congruence properties,
we derive the message mi [32]. For the proposed scheme
to properly decrypt the ciphertext C and obtain the message
sent, the relation between the message mi and the parameters
ki,vi,y−1i , ti, and ri, should satisfy the following inequality:
(15)mi <
ki
y−1i + vi · ti · ri
.
By substituting C in the right hand-side of (14) we get,
(16)(C (mod ki) · yi) (mod vi) =
(17)= (((
( n
∑
i=1
(mi · e′i · Ai ·
X
Ni
)
)
(mod X)) (mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi).
The following lemma, helps us in the next equality.
Lemma 2. Let a,b,c be three integer numbers. If a|b, then
(c (mod b)) (mod a) = c (mod a)
Proof. Let c = b · q+ u, where q ∈ Z and 0 ≤ u < b. Since,
a|b, then b = s ·a for some s ∈ Z. So, by plugging this in for
c = s ·a ·b+u. Hence, (c (mod b)) (mod a)≡ u (mod a)≡
c (mod a). 
Since ki|Ni = ki · pi and Ni|X , then ki|X by transitivity
property of division. By Lemma 2, we get that (C (mod
X)) (mod ki)≡C (mod ki).
Thus, equation (17) will become
(18)= ((
( n
∑
i=1
(mi · e′i · Ai ·
X
Ni
)
)
(mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi).
Because ki| XN j , ∀ j 6= i, j ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, it is implied that
m j · e′j ·A j · XN j ≡ 0 (mod ki). This leads us to the following
equation:
= ((
(
mi · e′i ·Ai ·
X
Ni
)
(mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi). (19)
Equation (19) contains the modular expression (Ai ·
X
Ni
) (mod ki) which is equal to (
(
Ai · XNi
)
(mod Ni)) (mod
ki) ≡ 1, from Lemma 2 and equation (9). Therefore, (Ai ·
X
Ni
) (mod ki) must also be 1. Using this, we get
= (((mi · e′i) (mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi). (20)
Substituting e′i by its equivalent expression given in equation
(11), we obtain
= (((mi · (ei+N′i · ri)) (mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi). (21)
Furthermore, we simultaneously replace ei and N′i with their
corresponding equivalent expressions given in (5) and (7),
respectively. This leads us to
(22)= (((mi · (ki · qi + y−1i + (Ni · fi + di · ti) · ri))
(mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi).
Since ki|Ni and ki|ki ·qi, after applying mod ki, we obtain
(23)= (((mi · (y−1i + di · ti · ri)) (mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi).
Based on Fermat’s little theorem [38], since di = v
ki
i mod
Ni, then after applying mod ki the last equation becomes
(24)= (((mi · (y−1i + vi · ti · ri)) (mod ki)) · yi) (mod vi).
In order to obtain the message mi, we need mi ·(y−1i +vi · ti ·
ri) to be less than ki, as shown in inequality (15). Therefore,
applying mod ki will not reduce the original expression,
mi · (y−1i + vi · ti · ri). Thus, eliminating mod ki we get the
following:
(25)= ((mi · (y−1i + vi · ti · ri)) · yi) (mod vi).
Because y−1i ·yi ≡ 1( mod vi), by multiplying by yi( mod
vi), we get the following equation:
(26)= (mi + mi · vi · ti · ri · yi) (mod vi).
Since the second term in (26) contains vi and mi < vi, then
after applying mod vi, the equation simplifies to
= mi. (27)
Thus, proof of equation (14) shows the validity of AMOUN.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section shows how AMOUN is indistinguishable under
adaptive chosen plaintext attack (IND−CPA) by proving
Theorem 3. In IND−CPA, the adversary can encrypt any
number of messages and retrieve the corresponding ciphertext,
where every encryption of a message should link to a new
ciphertext, even when all K+i s and mis do not change [5], [32].
The right-hand side of equation (28) represents the encryption
function of our cryptosystem, on which indistinguishability
depends. There are three possible distinct cases in terms of
knowledge that the adversary might have: a) the first case is
when the adversary provides the encryption oracle by 1 out of
n messages, b) the second case when the adversary provides
i out of n messages where 1 < i < n, and c) finally when the
adversary provides all the messages to the encryption oracle.
For simplicity, we assume that the adversary provides all the
messages being encrypted, and the adversary knows members
of the receiving group; therefore, the adversary knows what
public keys, K+1 , ...,K
+
n , are being used.
C = m1 ·S1+ ...+mi ·Si+ ...+mn ·Sn−BX , (28)
In equation (28), the operand B is the amount of information
loss, or the quotient, when the modulus of C is taken over
X . Therefore, B is dependent on the size of all messages,
fis, tis,ris, and X . On the other hand, to take advantage of
9CRT in our proposed scheme, we must assume that n > 1,
where n is the number of messages being encrypted.
Theorem 3. The proposed cryptosystem, AMOUN, is indis-
tinguishable under adaptive chosen plaintext attack, assuming
that a) the prime factorization problem is computationally
hard, b) the discrete logarithm problem is hard in the group
Zp, c) the use of the noise parameter makes the gcd attack
impossible, and d) finding the correct point on a given plane
and a given line is computationally infeasible.
Proof. We prove Theorem 3 by proving all the sufficient
conditions that are mentioned in the statement of the theorem,
following the approach given in [34], [35].
Now, we start by examining the security of the private and
public keys, K−i and K
+
i , respectively. First, we show the
security of K−i < ki,vi,yi >. The element ki is a prime number,
and in order to get Ni of size 2048− bits, based on the size
of Ni that is generally used in RSA [36], size of ki should be
1024−bits. According to [39], there are approximately 21015
prime numbers of size less than 1024− bits, which makes
it computationally hard for an adversary to find ki. The same
logic as for ki works to show that finding vi is computationally
infeasible. Since yi ∈ N and yi < vi, then finding yi is at least
as computationally hard as finding vi. Therefore, choosing a
large enough size for ki,vi, implies the security of K−i .
Furthermore, we show the security of K+i < Ni,ei,di >. The
first element of K+i , Ni, is the product of primes ki and pi, as
shown in equation (4). Since the prime factorization of integers
is known to be computationally infeasible, for large enough
primes, it is computationally infeasible to factor Ni [18], [32].
Definition 4. [Primes factoring assumption] For every prob-
abilistic polynomial time adversary A , there is a negligible
function ε such that:
Pr[A (Ni) ∈ {ki, pi}]≤ ε(n),
where ki and pi are primes with size n−bits and Ni = ki · pi.
According to [32], the best-known heuristic asymptotic
running time algorithm for prime factorization runs on average
in time 2O(n
1/3·(log n)2/3) to factor a number of size n− bits.
Therefore, ε(n) = 1/2O(n1/3·(log n)2/3). The above complexity
implies the security of Theorem 3-(a) and proves the security
of Ni in our cryptosystem.
One possible way to break the security is by computing the
gcd of two different Nis [20]. In other words, if gcd(Ni,N j)>
1, then the adversary can obtain one of the primes ki or
pi. Therefore, the adversary can break the security of the
cryptosystem. This could be an issue if the same prime is
used more than once to generate Nis. To solve this issue, the
recipients choose their primes randomly from a sufficiently
large space, and these primes should be truly unpredictable
numbers. In the proposed scheme, we assume that there is little
to no chance of prime collision, where the probability that two
recipients pick the same prime is extremely low [5], [9], [32].
Therefore, the chance of primes collision is profoundly low.
The element ei is generated using primes ki and qi in
addition to the modular inverse y−1i , which is a noise parameter
added to guarantee gcd(Ni,ei) = 1 [20], [21], as shown in
equation (5). In the absence of y−1i , the element ki would
be a divisor of both ei and Ni, which would imply that
ki|gcd(ei,Ni); therefore, the adversary can break the system.
Definition 5. [gcd attack on the noise parameter] For every
probabilistic polynomial time adversary A , there is a negli-
gible function ε such that,
Pr[A (Ni,ei) = ki]≤ ε(n),
where Ni = ki · pi and ei = ki ·qi + y−1i such that ki, pi and
qi are random primes with size n−bits, and |y−1i |< 2α .
According to [20], the best-known gcd attack to find
gcd(Ni,ei) = ki, using fast multiplication, is with the asymp-
totic complexity of 2α ·O(n), for integers of size n− bits.
Hence, ε(n) = 1/(2α · O(n)). This implies the security of
Theorem 3-(b) and proves the security of the parameter ei.
The last element of K+i , di, is generated using the two
primes ki and vi, as shown in equation (6). Since the dis-
crete logarithm problem is known to be mathematically and
computationally infeasible, then getting ki and vi given di is
not possible, as the parameter di is non-invertible because the
inverse of di is not unique [19], [32].
Lemma 3. Let G be a finite group. Let ki,vi be two prime
numbers in the group G. The element Ni is the product of two
primes ki and pi. Setting di ≡ vkii (mod Ni) gives the same
distribution for dˆi as choosing random dˆi ∈ G, i.e., for any
dˆi ∈G
Pr[vkii (mod Ni)≡ dˆi] = 1/|G|.
Proof. Let dˆi ∈G be arbitrary. Then,
Pr[vkii (mod Ni) = dˆi] = Pr[ki = logvi(di+q ·Ni)],
where q represents the infinite quotients of di (mod Ni).
Since both ki and vi are unknown primes that are truly
randomly generated, then the probability that ki is equal to
logvi(di+q ·Ni) is exactly 1/|G| [32]. 
The above complexity implies the security of Theorem 3-(c)
and proves the security of di in our cryptosystem.
Next we show that the private key elements ki,vi,yi are
secure against gcd attack, by knowing the public key elements
Ni,ei,di. We consider the gcd of every pair of public key
elements as follows:
• Case 1: Let gcd(Ni,ei) = g. If g = ki, then since g|ei
and g|ki · qi, we get that g|(ei − ki · qi) = y−1i which is
impossible since ki,yi are co-prime because ki is prime
and yi < ki. Using the same reasoning as above g 6= qi.
If g= y−1i , then g|(ei−y−1i ) = ki ·qi. The latter statement
does not hold true, as both ki,qi are prime numbers and
y−1i < ki,qi. The existence of the noise parameter y
−1
i
forces gcd(Ni,ei) = 1 [20], [21].
• Case 2: Let gcd(Ni,di) = g. If g = ki, then because di =
vkii −q ·ki · pi, for some quotient q, then g|(di+q ·ki · pi) =
vkii , which is impossible as g - vi, since vi is prime. Using
the same reasoning g 6= pi. If g = vi, then vi|(vkii −di) =
q ·ki · pi. For this to happen, as both ki and pi are primes,
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we need to have vi = ki or vi = pi, which is not the case
as all ki, pi,vi are different primes.
• Case 3: Let gcd(ei,di) = g. If g = y−1i , then
g|(ei − y−1i ) = ki · qi. For this to happen, as both
ki,qi are prime numbers, we need to have y−1i = ki or
y−1i = qi, which is not the case as y
−1
i < ki,qi. Following
the same reasoning as in case 1, g 6= ki,qi. Furthermore,
as in case 2, the inequalities g 6= vi, pi hold true.
We continue by proving the security of the encryption
elements, N′i and e′i. In the initialization phase, the sender
computes N′i for each recipient using parameters Ni and di,
in addition to the two randomly generated numbers fi and ti,
which are only known to the sender, as shown in equation (7).
For the adversary to be able to find N′i = Ni · fi + di · ti is by
brute force attack only since there are infinitely many triples
(N′i , fi, ti) that can satisfy the above equation. To enforce this
statement, let N′i = z, fi = x, ti = y and the known values (co-
efficients) Ni = a and di = b. Then, the equation z= a ·x+b ·y
represents a plane. This means that there are infinitely many
points satisfying the equation for a given pair (a,b), as shown
in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The complexity of finding a three dimensional point
on a plane is
f (x,y) = lim
x,y→∞O(x · y),
where x,y are the dimensions of a rectangle on the plane.
Proof. O(x · y) is the number of steps needed to find all the
points within a specific rectangular area of dimensions x,y on
the plane. As the rectangle expands to the whole plane, and
therefore the number of points increases toward infinity, then
the number of steps needed to find the specific point on the
plane is
f (x,y) = lim
x,y→∞O(x · y).

For the sake of security of the proposed cryptosystem,
it is crucial that the adversary can not find N′i and e′i. To
the contrary, since gcd(e′i,Ni) = 1, then the adversary could
obtain e
′−1
i (mod Ni) and retrieve any message mi, after some
mathematical operations.
Now, even in the case when the adversary finds N′i , which is
computationally infeasible, finding the corresponding e′i = ei+
N′i · ri, when given the public key parameters Ni,ei,di, is still
computationally infeasible. This is because the above equation
represents a line y = a · x+b, where y = e′i,x = ri,a = N′i and
b = ei, and the complexity of finding a point on a line is
shown in Lemma 5. Therefore, the adversary will not be able
to find the modular inverse of e′i with respect to Ni. Thus,
retrieving the message mi by computing C ·e′−1i (mod Ni), is
computationally infeasible.
Lemma 5. The complexity of finding a specific point in a
linear equation on two variables is
g(z) = lim
z→∞O(z),
where z is the number of integers within an interval of the line
represented by the equation given.
Proof. O(z) is the number of steps needed to find all the
integers within a specific interval of the line. As the interval
expands to the whole line, and therefore the number of integers
increases toward infinity, then the number of steps needed to
find the specific point on the line is
g(z) = lim
z→∞O(z).

Since there are additional random numbers fi, ti,ri not
known by the adversary in any case, then the adversary will not
be able to compute the encryption element Si of any recipient
i. This is because Si is the multiplication of e′i and AXi, as
shown in equation (12).
Theorem 4. Let f (x,y) be the function computing the com-
plexity of finding the correct three dimensional point (N′i , fi, ti)
on a given plane. Also, let g(z) be the function computing the
complexity of finding the correct two dimensional point (e′i,ri)
on a given line. Then, the complexity to find the correct Sis is
O(n · f (x,y) ·g(z)).
Proof. The proof for the theorem follows directly from
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. 
The above complexity implies the security of Theorem 3-(d)
and proves the security of N′i and e′i in our cryptosystem.
Next we show that our cryptosystem is indistinguishable
under chosen plaintext attack (IND−CPA). As mentioned in
Section IV-C, in every ciphertext, each sub-ciphertext ci =mi ·
Si contains ri, where ri is a random number generated for each
encryption. Due to the randomization property of ri, which
causes nonlinearity in equation (28), for the same message
vector M and the same public keys, different ciphertexts are
generated for different encryptions.
Indeed, let M be a message vector of size n to be encrypted
using K+1 , ...,K
+
n and Si = e
′
i ·Ai · XNi ,∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}. Based
on equation (28), if we encrypt M two times we will get the
two ciphertexts C and C” as follows:
(29)
C = (m1 · e′1 · A1 ·
X
N1
+ ...+ mi · e′i · Ai ·
X
Ni
+ ...+ mn
· e′n · An ·
X
Nn
) (mod X),
(30)
C” = (m1 · e1” · A1 · XN1 + ...+ mi · ei” · Ai ·
X
Ni
+ ...
+ mn · en” · An · XNn ) (mod X).
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Claim 1. C 6=C”
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that C=C”. After
subtracting the above equations on both sides, we get that
(31)
C −C”= (m1 ·(e′1−e1”) ·A1 ·
X
N1
+ ...+mi ·(e′i−ei”) ·Ai
· X
Ni
+ ...+mn ·(e′n−en”) ·An ·
X
Nn
) (mod X).
Since C =C”, then
(32)
m1 · (e′1 − e1”) · A1 ·
X
N1
+ ...+ mi · (e′i − ei”) · Ai
· X
Ni
+ ...+mn · (e′n− en”) ·An ·
X
Nn
≡ 0 (mod X).
Now taking mod Ni on both sides of equation (32), we obtain
the following:
(33)mi · (e′i − ei”) · Ai ·
X
Ni
≡ 0 (mod Ni).
Based on equation (9), Ai is the modular inverse of XNi with
respect to Ni. Therefore, equation (33) reduces to
(34)mi · (e′i − ei”) ≡ 0 (mod Ni).
After substituting e′i,ei” by their equivalent expressions as
in equation (11), the equivalent of the latter equation will be,
(35)mi · N′i · (ri − ri”) ≡ 0 (mod Ni).
Replacing N′i = Ni · ri+di · ti and after applying mod Ni on
both sides of equation (35), we get
(36)mi · di · ti · (ri − ri”) ≡ 0 (mod Ni).
Since mi, ti < ki and ki is a prime number, then the inverses
of mi and ti with respect to ki exist. By multiplying equation
(36) on both sides by m−1i mod ki and t
−1
i mod ki we obtain
the following equation,
(37)vi · (ri − ri”) ≡ 0 (mod ki).
Following the same reasoning as above since vi < ki, mul-
tiplying by v−1i mod ki, the following holds:
ri− ri”≡ 0 (mod ki). (38)
As both ri,ri” < ki, then (ri− ri”)< ki. Therefore, the only
case when equation (38) holds is when ri = ri”, which is
impossible as both ri and ri” are truly randomly generated.

Let Nrand = {N1”, . . . ,Nn”} be a randomly generated set
of cardinality n, where n is the number of recipients in the
receiving group, and let X” = ∏ni=1 Ni”. Also, let Erand =
{e1”, . . . ,en”} be a randomly generated set of cardinality n,
for each i. On the other hand, let Nreal = {N′1, . . . ,N′n} and
Ereal = {e′1, . . . ,e′n} be two sets generated using K+1 , . . . ,K+n ,
respectively. Moreover, let M be a message vector of size n
to be encrypted.
Now, consider the following two distributions:
• Distribution of the set Sreal = {S1, . . . ,Sn} which is
generated using the two real sets Nreal and Ereal .
• Distribution of the set Srand = {S1”, . . . ,Sn”} which is
generated using the two random sets Nrand and Erand .
The adversary A solves the decision problem by effec-
tively distinguishing two distributions, Srand and Sreal , in
polynomial time. In other words, given a challenge ciphertext
C from the encryption oracle, the adversary should know
which distribution has been used in the encryption to generate
C. Furthermore, the encryption oracle randomly selected a
distribution Sb, where b∈{random,real}, andA should guess
which distribution was chosen to get C.
The advantage of the adversary to link the challenge cipher-
text to the correct distribution should be negligible. Moreover,
if finding the correct pair (N′i ,e′i) for all recipients n is
hard, then there is no significant change in the behavior of
the adversary A when the distribution Sreal is replaced by
the random distribution Srand . Therefore, if we perform this
substitution between the two distributions Sreal and Srand , and
the advantage of A is negligible, then the message vector M is
completely hidden, which implies security of the cryptosystem
AMOUN.
Claim 2. Pr[C = ESreal (M)] = Pr[C = ESrand (M)]+ε .
Proof. We will start by showing that if the input of the security
parameters comes from Sreal , as shown in equation (39), the
adversary will have a negligible advantage to get information
that helps in guessing the hidden bit b, given the challenge
ciphertext C and K+1 , . . . ,K
+
n .
(39)C = (m1 · S1 + ...+ mi · Si + ...+ mn · Sn) (mod X).
As mentioned above, it is computationally infeasible for the
adversary to get N′i given Ni and di, as equation (7) becomes
linear function of the form z = a ·x+b ·y; therefore, there are
infinitely many ordered pairs (N′i , fi, ti) that satisfy the linear
function, as shown in Lemma 4. Also, even in the case when
the adversary computes the proper N′i , it is computationally
infeasible for the adversary to get e′i given ei and N′i , as
equation (11) becomes linear function of the form y= a ·x+b;
therefore, there are infinitely many ordered pairs (e′i,ri) that
could be the correct solution of the linear function as shown
in Lemma 5.
On the other hand, if the input of the security parameters
comes from Srand , as shown in equation (40), then the adver-
sary will have a negligible advantage to determine hidden bit
b, given the challenge ciphertext C and K+1 , . . . ,K
+
n .
(40)C = (m1 · S1”+ ...+mi · Si”+ ...+mn · Sn”) (mod X”).
SinceA cannot find a closed form solution for the nonlinear
equation (40) with 3 · n unknown variables, then A will not
be able to find fi”, ti”,ri”, for any recipient i, given C. This
implies that the distribution of the bit b is independent from
the view of A ; therefore, the advantage of A is negligible.
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Based on the above reasoning, from the view of A , the en-
cryption elements of both Sreal and Srand are random elements.
Therefore, A cannot effectively distinguish two distributions
in polynomial time. Thus, the advantage of A is negligible if
Sreal is replaced by Srand . 
Now, let Mb ∈MsgSp(v), b∈{0,1}, be two message vectors
of size n to be encrypted, where |M0|= |M1|. The cryptosystem
is not IND−CPA if the adversary A effectively distinguishes
M0 and M1 in polynomial time, given a challenge ciphertext
C. After the encryption oracle encrypts one of the message
vectors at random, the encryption oracle provides A with
C. Then the adversary A should guess which of the given
message vectors relates to C.
The advantage of A to link the challenge ciphertext to
the correct message vector should be negligible. Moreover,
since the coins {r1, . . . ,rn} randomize the ciphertext C, and
computing the security parameters S1, ...,Sn is hard, then the
advantage of A is negligible, which implies the cryptosystem
AMOUN to be IND−CPA.
Claim 3. Pr[C = E(M0)]=Pr[C = E(M1)]+ε .
Proof. Since the adversary knows the message vectors and the
challenge ciphertext C, then in the equation (28), the adversary
will have 3 ·n unknown variables fi, ti,ri,∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}. In
the best case, when the number of recipients is at the minimum
n = 2, there are still 6 unknown variables which cannot be
rewritten in terms of the known variables because of nonlin-
earity. It is impossible to find a closed-form solution having
1 nonlinear equation on 6 variables, unless the advantage of
a very specific relationship between the unknown variables,
where the equation factoring can be completely taken place.
Following the exact same reasoning as in Claim 1 and Claim
2, the coin ri,∀i∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} is randomly generated for each
encryption and cannot be rewritten in terms of the known
variables. Since A cannot compute e
′−1
i (mod Ni) because
finding all N′i s and e′is is extremely hard based on Theorem 4,
then A will not be able to retrieve any message mi.
Therefore, A cannot learn any other information from
knowing the challenge ciphertext C and M0,M1, given to the
encryption oracle, which implies that the probability that the
encryption oracle encrypted, M0, is the same as probability
that the encryption oracle encrypted M1, up to a negligible
advantage ε = 1/(O(n · f (x,y) ·g(z))) obtained by Theorem 4.

The above three claims imply the indistinguishability of our
proposed cryptosystem. 
AMOUN is not secure against any form of chosen ciphertext
attack (CCA). Though no mathematical solution can be done
to solve this issue, we propose padding as a possible method
of making our scheme CCA secure. As for CCA, it has not
been solved for RSA without involving padding [9], [28], [40];
therefore, we cannot see an easy modification to allow for
CCA in our scheme as it stands even with modifications to the
decryption.
VII. TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
This section explains the time complexity of AMOUN
and compares it with RSA and Multi-RSA. Specifically, we
explore the time complexity of initialization, encryption, and
decryption. Then, we compare it with the time complexity
of RSA and Multi-RSA, since they have a similar mathemat-
ical formulation as AMOUN. To calculate time complexity,
we make certain assumptions. First, basic arithmetic opera-
tions such as addition and subtraction have time complexity
O(blog(n)c+ 1), where n is the size of the largest decimal
operand. Second, multiplication, division, and modulus have
time complexity O((blog(n)c+ 1)2), where n is the size of
the largest decimal operand. Third, the exponentiation takes
O(blog(n)c·(blog(w)c+1)2) when using Binary Method, also
known as the square and multiply method [41], where n
is the size of the decimal power and w is the size of the
decimal modulus. Fourth, for very large numbers, the extended
Euclidean algorithm takes O(blog(n)c2), where n is the size
of the largest decimal operand [32]. Table III presents the
comparison of time complexity for AMOUN, Multi-RSA, and
RSA.
Based on these assumptions, initialization for AMOUN
takes O(n · (4 · (blog(X)c+1)2 + blog(X)c2 + blog(Ni)c+1)),
where X is the largest operand and n is number of recip-
ients. AMOUN’s initialization requires two multiplications
and one addition to compute N′i , one multiplication of Ni
to get X , performing the extended Euclidean algorithm to
find Ai, and one multiplication to get AXi. Now as X grows,
the cost of other factors becomes negligible. Therefore, time
complexity of AMOUN’s initialization is O(n · ((blog(X)c+
1)2 + blog(X)c2)). Moreover, Multi-RSA initialization takes
O(n · ((blog(X)c+ 1)2 + blog(X)c2)) since it performs two
multiplications and the Extended Euclidean Algorithm for n
recipients, where RSA scheme does not have initialization [9].
Encryption for AMOUN takes O(n · (4 · (blog(X)c+ 1)2 +
2 · (blog(X)c+ 1))), where X is the largest operand and n is
number of recipients. AMOUN’s encryption requires one mul-
tiplication and one addition to compute e′i, one multiplication
to get Si, one multiplication and one addition to find the sub-
ciphertext ci, and one mod X operation. Now as X grows,
the constants become negligible. Therefore, for AMOUN,
time complexity of encryption is O(n · ((blog(X)c+ 1)2 +
(blog(X)c+ 1))). On the other hand, Multi-RSA encryption
takes O(n · (blog(ei)c · (blog(Ni)c+ 1)2 + (blog(X)c+ 1)2) +
(blog(X)c+1)2), where ei is the public key, Ni is the modulus,
X is the product of all Nis, and n is number of recipients.
Multi-RSA encryption requires one exponentiation and one
multiplication, for each recipient i, and one mod X operation
at the end. Now as X grows, the mod X operation become
negligible. Therefore, the time complexity of Multi-RSA en-
cryption is O(n · (blog(ei)c · (blog(Ni)c+ 1)2 + (blog(X)c+
1)2)) [9]. RSA’s encryption takes O(blog(ei)c · (blog(Ni)c+
1)2) for one recipient, as it performs only one exponentiation
operation. Therefore, RSA takes O(n ·(blog(ei)c ·(blog(Ni)c+
1)2)) for n recipients, where ei is the public key and Ni is the
modulus.
Decryption for AMOUN takes O(3 · (blog(C)c+ 1)2) for
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TABLE III
TIME COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF AMOUN , MULTI-RSA, AND RSA
Initialization Encryption Decryption for one recipient
AMOUN O(n · ((blog(X)c+1)2 + blog(X)c2)) O(n · ((blog(X)c+1)2 +(blog(X)c+1))) O((blog(C)c+1)2)
Multi-RSA O(n · ((blog(X)c+1)2 + blog(X)c2)) O(n · (blog(ei)c · (blog(Ni)c+1)2 +(blog(X)c+1)2)) O(blog(di)c · (blog(Ni)c+1)2)
RSA NA O(n · (blog(ei)c · (blog(Ni)c+1)2)) O(blog(di)c · (blog(Ni)c+1)2)
one recipient, where C is the ciphertext. We take mod ki, then
multiply the result by the random number yi, and we take
mod vi to get mi. Now as C grows, the constant becomes
negligible. Therefore, AMOUN has a time complexity of
O((blog(C)c+ 1)2). On the other hand, decryption of both
RSA and Multi-RSA takes O(blog(di)c · (blog(Ni)c+1)2) for
one recipients, where di is the private key and Ni is the
modulus.
VIII. EVALUATION
This section presents the performance evaluation of
AMOUN and shows its comparative analysis with respect to
RSA and Multi-RSA since both of them rely on the properties
of modulus [17] and prime factorization problem [18]. The key
size was varied from 1024− bits to 6144− bits. All experi-
ments were performed on an Intel Core i7−3517U CPU with
8GB memory. AMOUN’s core library, RSA, and Multi-RSA
were implemented in Visual Studio 2017 v15.3 with .NET 4.7
using C# 7.1. We ran each test 1000 times, and the results were
averaged to remove any outliers.
Keys of RSA and Multi-RSA were generated from primes Pi
and Qi. The recurrence of prime numbers was avoided during
any single test. The size of both Pi and Qi is 1024−bits, the
size of ei and di is also roughly 1024−bits, and the size of Ni
is close to 2048−bits. Public key ei was randomly generated
such that it is less than Pi and co-prime with (Pi− 1) · (Qi−
1). Private key di was found as the modular inverse of ei
with respect to (Pi−1) · (Qi−1). On the other hand, keys of
AMOUN were generated from primes ki, pi, qi, and vi. Size
of Ni, ei and di is close to 2048− bits for primes of size
1024− bits, 4096− bits for primes of size 2048− bits, and
6144−bits for primes of size 3072−bits, respectively. Lastly,
messages were randomly generated such that they were less
than every prime we use.
Performance evaluation of AMOUN’s initialization, encryp-
tion, and decryption was done compared to the corresponding
phases of Multi-RSA. Since RSA does not have an ini-
tialization phase, the comparison was done with respect to
encryption and decryption only. The first phase is initializing
the needed parameters in the encryption phase using public
keys K+1 , ...,K
+
n accordingly for n recipients. The second phase
is encrypting n messages, m1, ...,mn, using the initialized
parameters, accordingly. After that, producing ciphertext C
for AMOUN and Multi-RSA, where concatenating every sub-
ciphertext ci to come up with ciphertext C for RSA. This
gives us a fair comparison to AMOUN because RSA is not
a multi-recipient cryptographic scheme. For the third phase,
we decrypt ciphertext C using private key K−i to recover the
original message mi.
Fig. 1. Total initialization time: AMOUN with key size 2048-bits and Multi-
RSA with key size 1024-bits
A. Initialization: AMOUN and Multi-RSA
We compare the total initialization computational cost of
AMOUN to that of Multi-RSA, as shown in Fig. 1. Ini-
tialization time for both AMOUN and Multi-RSA includes
initializing the needed parameters in the encryption phase for
a receiving group of size n in order to encrypt the messages
using public keys K+1 , ...,K
+
n , accordingly. The size of public
keys that AMOUN uses is 2048− bits, whereas Multi-RSA
uses public keys of size 1024−bits.
From Fig. 1, it is apparent that Multi-RSA has better
performance than AMOUN, when the number of recipients
is up to 10. Moreover, Multi-RSA shows 3% lower aver-
age processing time than AMOUN. The reason is that, for
AMOUN, the parameter N′i is computed for every recipient
in the initialization phase instead of the encryption phase,
as shown in equation (7). This small overhead improves the
performance of the encryption phase, where the initialization
phase is only done once for the group before the start of the
encryption phase. On the other hand, there is no initialization
phase for RSA scheme.
B. Encryption: AMOUN, RSA , and Multi-RSA
For encryption phase, we encrypt n randomly generated
messages with the same size using K+1 , ...,K
+
n for both RSA
and Multi-RSA, and S1, ...,Sn for AMOUN, accordingly, then
compute C for AMOUN and Multi-RSA schemes. On the other
hand, to perform a fair comparison with RSA, we concatenate
every sub-ciphertext ci to get C for RSA. This is because RSA
is not a native multi-recipient cryptographic scheme.
Fig. 2 compares the computational cost of the encryption
algorithm of AMOUN with key sizes 2048, 4096, 6144−bits
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Fig. 2. Total encryption time: AMOUN with key sizes 2048, 4096, and 6144-
bits, RSA and Multi-RSA with key size 1024-bit
to that of RSA and Multi-RSA with key size 1024− bits. It
is clear that, with respect to time required for encryption,
AMOUN performs significantly better than both RSA and
Multi-RSA, even for larger key sizes when a number of
recipients is up to 10. Moreover, it can be seen that when
the number of recipients increases, the performance gain of
AMOUN, in terms of computational cost for encryption, will
be further improved. Hence, AMOUN is particularly more
useful for applications having a high number of recipients.
Quantitative analysis reveals that AMOUN with 2048− bits
key size shows 99% lower average computational cost than
both RSA and Multi-RSA with 1024− bits key size. Also,
AMOUN with 4096− bits key size shows 98% and 99%
lower average computational cost than RSA and Multi-RSA
with 1024− bits key size, respectively. Moreover, AMOUN
with 6144−bits key size shows 97% and 98% lower average
computational cost than RSA and Multi-RSA with 1024−bits
key size, respectively.
C. Decryption: AMOUN, RSA, and Multi-RSA
In order to compare AMOUN with RSA and Multi-RSA in
terms of time to perform decryption of ciphertexts, we com-
pute the decryption time for every recipient for all schemes. In
other words, we compute the time all recipients take to decrypt
C using their private keys K−i s to get all messages mi, · · · ,mn
for each scheme. Fig. 3 compares the decryption computa-
tional cost of AMOUN with key sizes 1024, 2048, 3072−bits
to that of RSA and Multi-RSA with key size 1024− bits.
Fig. 3 represents decryption time for RSA and Multi-RSA
together since both use the same decryption algorithm. Note
that the performance of AMOUN is better than both RSA and
Multi-RSA, as its decryption time is significantly less, even
for larger key sizes when the number of recipients is up to 10.
Furthermore, AMOUN with 1024− bits and 2048− bits key
sizes shows 99% lower average computational cost than RSA
and Multi-RSA with 1024−bits key size. Also, AMOUN with
3072−bits key size shows 98% lower average computational
cost than RSA and Multi-RSA with 1024−bits key size.
Fig. 3. Total decryption time: AMOUN with key sizes 1024, 2048, and 3072-
bits, RSA and Multi-RSA with key size 1024-bit
IX. DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyze the performance gain obtained by
AMOUN in the encryption phase. We perform a comparative
analysis of our scheme with existing solutions such as RSA
and Multi-RSA. We discuss the advantages of AMOUN in
terms of timeliness and scalability. This can be demonstrated
by applying our scheme in real-time wireless connected en-
vironments having resource constraints such as WSNs and
VANETs.
It can be concluded from section VIII-A and Fig. 1 that there
is a slight overhead of AMOUN’s initialization compared to
Multi-RSA’s. However, this initialization will occur only once
per receiving group at the sender side, which is negligible
considering the 99% gain in terms of the computational cost
of encryption. Fig. 4 shows the significant improvement in
performance, by decoupling initialization from encryption, and
computing N′i in the initialization phase instead of the encryp-
tion phase, as shown in equation (7). We obtain this perfor-
mance gain in the encryption phase by reducing its complexity
from O(n · ((blog(X)c+ 1)2 + blog(X)c2 + (blog(X)c+ 1)))
to O(n · ((blog(X)c+ 1)2 +(blog(X)c+ 1))), where n is the
number of recipients, and X is the multiplication of all Nis
of receiving group, as shown in equation (8). Quantitative
analysis reveals that, with 2048− bits and 4096− bits keys
size, the encryption is on average 93 and 92 times faster than
the coupling of the initialization and encryption, respectively.
It is clear from these results and Fig. 4, that we gain more
improvement in the performance of encryption when the size
of key increases.
As AMOUN is a pure asymmetric multi-recipient crypto-
graphic scheme, it overcomes the overhead of key distribution.
On the other hand, for encryption and decryption, AMOUN
introduces a lightweight multi-recipient cryptographic scheme.
For encryption and decryption, existing asymmetric solutions
introduce huge computational cost compared to what AMOUN
exhibits. Note that the lightweight nature of AMOUN does
not affect its strength compared to other known multi-recipient
asymmetric cryptographic schemes. For example, Fig. 2 shows
that AMOUN with 2048−bits key size is on average 538 times
faster than Multi-RSA with 1024−bits key size for encryption
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Fig. 4. Total encryption time for AMOUN with keys size 2048 and 4096-bits:
encryption vs. initialization & encryption.
when the number of recipients is up to 10. Moreover, Fig. 3
shows that, for 1024− bits key size, AMOUN is on average
1035 times faster than Multi-RSA for decryption, when the
number of recipients is up to 10.
Note that for real time applications, when the sender has to
perform secure multi-recipient communication and is resource
deficient (less CPU, memory, and energy), RSA and Multi-
RSA would become inapplicable due to their high compu-
tational cost. For example, our analysis shows that using an
Intel Core i7−3517U CPU with 8GB memory, when no other
applications were running, AMOUN took 743 microseconds
compared to Multi-RSA which consumed 325 milliseconds,
and took 747 microseconds to 553 milliseconds, for en-
cryption and decryption, respectively, when the size of the
receiving group is 10. From Fig. 2 and 3, it is clear that
there is a huge difference in terms of computational cost
between AMOUN and Multi-RSA, for encryption and de-
cryption, respectively. In wireless mobile infrastructure-based
networks, such as WSNs and VANETS, where the sender (i.e.
RSU, AP, and BS) needs to securely communicate with a
mobile receiving group, AMOUN will be a preferable choice
compared to RSA and Multi-RSA. Even for infrastructure-less
based mobile networks, where the sender could be a mobile
cluster head, the above conclusion holds true.
In order to quantitatively assess the reduction of com-
munication overhead compared to traditional unicast-based
schemes, assume the size of data needed to be sent to each
recipient is λ , maximum allowable size for the packet is
γ , and the number of recipients is n. AMOUN introduces
communication overhead of factor µ/γ , where µ = λ · n is
the total encrypted ciphertext size. As λ approaches to γ ,
which is the worst-case scenario for AMOUN, performance
improvement over traditional schemes will be close to 1.
In all other scenarios, AMOUN will always involve less
communication overhead compared to traditional schemes.
Note traditional unicast-based schemes always requires at least
n number of transmissions. In addition, AMOUN requires zero
communication overhead among recipients or between sender
and recipients when the recipient group changes. This makes
AMOUN ideal for systems, such as WSNs and VANETs,
where there is little or no trust among individual recipients.
From Fig. 2, it is apparent that as the size of receiv-
ing group increases, the computational cost for existing so-
lutions, like Multi-RSA, grows exponentially which makes
these schemes less scalable in wireless distributed network
environments. Moreover, quantitative analysis reveals that,
AMOUN with 2048− bits key size took 743 microseconds
compared to Multi-RSA which consumed 325 milliseconds
with 1024−bits key size, AMOUN took 14 milliseconds com-
pared to Multi-RSA which consumed 1.5 seconds, and took
127 milliseconds to 4.2 seconds, when the size of the receiving
group are 10, 50, and 150, respectively. Based on these results,
it is clear that as the size of the receiving group increases,
AMOUN is more scalable than Multi-RSA. Furthermore, for
resource-constrained environments, the use of AMOUN to
secure multi-recipient communications is practical. One of our
future works is to validate the applicability of AMOUN in
WSNs and VANETs.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper presented AMOUN, a novel cryptographic
scheme. AMOUN effectively integrates the mathematical for-
mulations of CRT, prime factorization, discrete logarithm, and
the use of the noise parameter, to achieve an efficient asymmet-
ric multi-recipient cryptosystem. The proposed scheme over-
comes many challenges other multi-recipient cryptographic
schemes face, including but not limited to, the possibility of
compromising group privacy, the collusion among recipients,
and the need for key distribution. Security analysis shows
that AMOUN is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen plain-
text attack. Moreover, complexity and performance analyses
show the effectiveness of AMOUN. Empirical results show
that AMOUN introduces lower average computational cost,
compared to both RSA and Multi-RSA, for both encryption
and decryption. The performance of AMOUN increases sig-
nificantly compared to RSA and Multi-RSA when the size of
both keys and multi-recipient group increase.
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